Abstract: This paper is motivated by the questions of how to give the concept of probability an adequate real-world meaning, and how to explain a certain type of phenomenon that can be found, for instance, in Ellsberg's paradox. It attempts to answer these questions by constructing an alternative theory to one that was proposed in earlier papers on the basis of various important criticisms that were raised against this earlier theory. The conceptual principles of the corresponding definition of probability are laid out and explained in detail. In particular, what is required to fully specify a probability distribution under this definition is not just the distribution function of the variable concerned, but also an assessment of the internal and/or the external strength of this function relative to other distribution functions of interest. This way of defining probability is applied to various examples and problems including, perhaps most notably, to a long-running controversy concerning the distinction between Bayesian and fiducial inference. The characteristics of this definition of probability are carefully evaluated in terms of the issues that it sets out to address.
Introduction
Over the years the issue of how to give the concept of probability a real-world meaning has proved to be controversial, see for example Fine (1973) , Gillies (2000) and Eagle (2011) .
Closely related to this issue is the problem of how to adequately elicit subjective probabilities in any given practical context. Various approaches have been suggested to tackle this latter problem, see for example, Kadane and Wolfson (1998) , Garthwaite, Kadane and O'Hagan (2005) , O'Hagan et al. (2006) and Kynn (2008) . A method incorporated into some of these approaches involves comparing the likeliness of any given event of interest with the likeliness of various given unions of outcomes of a standard experiment, e.g. drawing a ball out of an urn containing distinctly labelled balls or spinning what is known as a probability wheel (see Spetzler and Stael von Holstein 1975) .
In Bowater (2017a) a definition of the probability of an event was proposed, namely type B probability, that was based around this elicitation method, and in particular, on ordering the similarities that are felt between the likeliness of the two events in various given event pairings. This definition was subsequently extended in Bowater (2017b) so that continuous probability distributions could be characterized in an analogous manner, and was applied to the problem of statistical inference both in Bowater (2017b) and Bowater and Guzmán (2018) . However, the following criticisms have been raised against this definition of probability:
1) It is unclear how probabilities can be made to obey the additivity rule of probability, which is regarded as one of the main aims of the definition.
2) It is inconvenient that probabilities are only defined at evenly spaced points on the interval [0, 1] with the spacing between points being potentially quite large.
3) The dependency of probabilities on a reference set of events is unattractive.
4) The definition does not appear to be universal, e.g. the type of characterization this 2 definition gives to continuous probability distributions was not extended to discrete or categorical probability distributions.
The main aim of the present paper is to substantially overhaul this definition of probability in a way that attempts to address these criticisms.
As well as trying to give probability an adequate real-world meaning, the work outlined in the present paper, as was the case in Bowater (2017a) , is motivated by the question of how to explain a particular type of phenomenon which can not be easily explained by applying the conventional mathematical definition of probability. One of the most standard (but perhaps one of the least convincing) instances of this type of phenomenon can be found in what is known as Ellsberg's two colour or two urn example, see Ellsberg (1961) . Given that some readers may not be familiar with this example it will now be briefly outlined.
Let us imagine that there are two urns that both contain 100 balls where each ball may be either red or black in colour. In the first urn the ratio of red to black balls is entirely unknown, i.e. there may be from 0 to 100 red or black balls in the urn. By contrast, in the second urn it is known that there are exactly 50 red balls and 50 black balls. An individual is asked to decide which urn he would prefer to randomly draw a ball out of if getting a red ball wins $100 while getting a black ball wins nothing, and which urn he would prefer if a black ball wins $100 while a red ball wins nothing.
In Ellsberg (1961) it is claimed that, first, the majority of people would prefer the second urn in response to both questions, which is a claim supported by later experiments, e.g. Fellner (1961) , Becker and Brownson (1964) and Curley and Yates (1989) and, perhaps more importantly, that this behaviour can not be assumed to be irrational.
This type of behaviour is regarded by some as representing a paradox, and is in fact known as a version of Ellsberg's paradox, as it goes against the idea that an individual would prefer the urn associated with the highest probability of winning the prize or be 3 indifferent between urns that have the same probability of winning the prize.
Having clarified the motivation for this paper, let us give a brief description of its structure. The main theoretical principles of the definition of probability that will be proposed are laid out and explained in detail in the sections that immediately follow, in particular Sections 2.1 to 3.5. A substantive application of this definition of probability is then presented in Sections 3.6 and 3.7, and a possible extension to the main theory with regard to a special case is proposed in Section 3.8. The final two sections of the paper discuss how well the theory achieves the objectives that have been outlined in the present section.
Fundamental concepts

Disclaimer
While the theory that will be outlined in the present paper has a great deal in common with the theory outlined in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b , it is nevertheless a theory that is intended as a substitute for, rather than an extension of, this earlier theory. As a result the definitions used in the present paper generally stand alone from those used in these earlier papers, and caution is recommended in using this earlier work to try to gain greater insight about the present work.
Probabilities and probability distributions
In contrast to Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b where the concept of strength was developed separately for the probability of an event and for continuous probability distributions, here the concept of strength will be defined primarily as a concept that is applied to (cumulative) distribution functions.
A probability distribution will be defined by its distribution function and the strength 4 of this function relative to other distribution functions of interest. The distribution function will be defined as having the standard mathematical properties of such a function.
The definition of the concept of strength will be outlined and discussed in detail in Section 3, after some more fundamental concepts have been presented in the sections that immediately follow.
In the theory that will be developed, the probabilities of events will be analysed in the context of the discrete or continuous distribution functions to which they must be associated. This includes the simple case where the distribution function is defined by just the probability of a given event and that of its complement, i.e. a Bernoulli distribution function.
Similarity
Let S(A, B) denote the similarity that a given individual feels there is between his confidence (or conviction) that an event A will occur and his confidence (or conviction) that an event B will occur. For any three events A, B and C, it will be assumed that an individual is capable of deciding whether or not the orderings S(A, B) > S(A, C) and S(A, B) < S(A, C) are applicable. The notation S(A, B) = S(A, C) will be used to represent the case where neither of these orderings apply. However, for any fourth event D, it will not be assumed, in general, that an individual is capable of deciding whether or not the orderings S(A, B) > S(C, D) and S(A, B) < S(C, D) are applicable. Therefore, a similarity S(A, B) can be categorized as a partially orderable attribute of any given pair of events A and B. This is essentially the same definition of the concept of similarity as used in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b 
. . , O k } be a finite ordered set of k mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. It will be assumed that for any given three subsets O(1), O(2) and O(3) of the set O that contain the same number of events, the following is true:
It now follows that the discrete reference set of events R is defined by
where
It should be clear that any given individual could easily decide that the set of all the outcomes of drawing a ball out of an urn containing k distinctly labelled balls could be the set O.
Definition 2: Continuous reference set of events Let V be a random variable that must take a value in the interval Λ = (0, 1). It will be assumed that for any given three subsets Λ(1), Λ(2) and Λ(3) of the interval (0, 1) that have the same total length, the following is true:
It now follows that the continuous reference set of events R is defined by equation (1) but with the set Λ defined as it is presently, i.e. as the interval (0, 1) and the event R(λ) defined to be the event {V < λ}.
Again, it should be clear that any given individual could easily decide that the outcome of spinning a wheel of unit circumference, as defined by the position on its circumference indicated by a fixed pointer in its centre, could be the variable V , assuming the position is measured as the distance in a given direction around the circumference from a given point on the circumference.
Scaling events
A scaling event L(λ) will be defined as the event {V * < λ}, where λ ∈ [0, 1] and V * has the same definition as the random variable V used in Definition 2 but with the added condition that it must be the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment, such as the outcome of spinning the type of wheel described in the previous section. Since what does or does not constitute a well-understood physical experiment is rather vague, the definition of a scaling event is open to criticism. The relevance of this criticism should be taken into account with respect to the way scaling events are used in the rest of this paper.
Compatibility of reference sets
A discrete or continuous reference set R 0 will be defined as being compatible with a discrete or continuous reference set R 1 if Λ 0 ∩ Λ 1 = ∅, where Λ 0 and Λ 1 are the sets of allowable values of λ for R 0 and R 1 respectively and, for all conceivable pairs of events E 0 and E 1 , and all λ ∈ Λ 0 ∩ Λ 1 , it holds that
For example, we would expect a rational individual to decide that a reference set R 0 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from an urn containing 10 distinctly labelled balls is compatible with a reference set R 1 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from an urn containing 100 distinctly labelled balls, where the set Λ 0 ∩ Λ 1 would be of course equal to the set Λ 0 = {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}. Also, a rational individual may well decide that a reference set R 0 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from an urn containing k distinctly labelled balls is compatible with a reference set R 1 based on the outcome of spinning the type of wheel described in Section 2.4, where the set Λ 0 ∩ Λ 1 would be of course equal to the set Λ 0 = {1/k, 2/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k}.
On the other hand, similar to Ellsberg's two urn example described in the Introduction, let us imagine that there are two urns that both contain k balls, where each ball has been marked with a number that is in the range from 1 to k. In the first urn, the number of balls that have been marked with any given number is entirely unknown, i.e. there may be 0 to k balls marked with any given number, while in the second urn, similar to the example that has just been discussed, we know that there is exactly one ball that has been marked with any given number. Here, in comparison to the earlier examples, it would be expected that a much smaller proportion of rational individuals would be prepared to treat a reference set R 0 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from the first urn as being compatible with a reference set R 1 based on the outcomes of drawing out a ball from the second urn.
3. Strength of a distribution function 3.1. Overview
As mentioned in Section 2.2, in order to complete the definition of a probability distribution, the strength of its distribution function relative to other distribution functions of interest needs to be established. In the following sections, the strength of a distribution function will be defined in terms of the context in which the concept of strength is being applied.
When eliciting a distribution function
First, we will define the concept of strength in the case where a given individual is trying to elicit a distribution function for a given random variable X based on his own personal opinion. In this context, it would seem appropriate to use a concept of strength that will be referred to as internal strength. This concept will now be defined separately for continuous and for discrete distribution functions.
Definition 3: Internal strength for continuous distribution functions
Let a given continuous random variable X of possibly various dimensions have two proposed distribution functions F X (x) and G X (x). We define the set of events F[a] by
where {X ∈ A} is the event that X lies in the set A and f X (x) is the density function corresponding to F X (x), and we define the set G[a] in the same way with respect to the distribution function G X (x). It now follows that for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that are independent of X, the distribution function F X (x) is defined as being internally stronger than the distribution function G X (x) at the resolution level λ, where λ is any value in the set Λ corresponding to the set R, if
To give an example of the application of this definition, let us imagine that a doctor is trying to elicit a distribution function for the change in average survival time X caused by the administration of a new drug in comparison to a standard drug. We will assume that the reference set of events R is based on the outcome of spinning the type of wheel described in Section 2.4, and that the resolution λ is some value in the interval [0.05, 0.95].
Let G X (x) be the current proposed distribution function for X. The aim is therefore to try to adjust this distribution function so that it better represents what is known about the variable X, which we will regard as being equivalent to achieving some kind of overall increase in the similarities S(A, R(λ)) where A ∈ G[λ].
In particular, it is natural to put more attention on increasing the smaller of these similarities without lowering by too much, or at all, the larger of these similarities. Hence, it would seem sensible to take another step in the elicitation process if an alternative distribution function F X (x) is judged as being (according to Definition 3) internally stronger than the distribution function G X (x). The distribution function F X (x) would then become the current proposed distribution function for X, and the elicitation process would continue until no improvements to this distribution function can be made.
Definition 4: Internal strength for discrete distribution functions
Let a given discrete random variable X that can only take a value x that belongs to the finite or countable set {x 1 , x 2 , . . .} have two proposed distribution functions F X (x) and
. . be scaling events (as defined in Section 2.5) that are independent of the variable X. Furthermore, we define the set of events F[a] by
where f X (x) is the probability mass function corresponding to F X (x), and [ ] on the right-hand side of this equation denotes the indicator function, and we define the set of events G[a] in the same way with respect to G X (x).
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that are independent of X and the scaling events
as being internally stronger than the function G X (x) at the resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if the condition in equation (3) is satisfied with respect to the definitions currently being used.
One of the reasons for the first predicate in the definition of F[a] in equation (4), i.e.
the condition that at most only value in the set b 1 , b 2 , . . . is not equal to 0 or 1, is that without this predicate there would be an event in the set F[a] that would be effectively equivalent to any of the scaling events L 1 (a), L 2 (a), . . ., i.e. the event corresponding to
In other words, the event would have the very undesirable property of not depending on the distribution function of interest F X (x). The practical importance of this issue will perhaps be more clearly seen when this definition of F[a] is used again in Section 3.3.
The application of Definition 4 of internal strength can be illustrated by imagining that an election for a state governor has five candidates, and a political analyst is trying to elicit probabilities for the events x 1 , x 2 , ..., x 5 of each one of these candidates winning.
The reference set of events R and the resolution λ will be defined as in the previous example, and let the current proposed distribution function and mass function for the variable in question be G X (x) and g X (x) respectively. At any given stage of the elicitation process, the smaller of the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ G[λ]} will usually be caused by one or two of the probabilities in the set {g X (x i ) : i = 1, 2, ..., 5} being relatively poor representations of the analyst's beliefs. This being the case, it would seem natural that the next step in the elicitation process would be to try to lessen this important defect, which effectively means that we should try to increase the minimum similarity on the right-hand side of equation (3). Hence, it would seem sensible to allow an alternative distribution function F X (x) to replace G X (x) as the current proposed distribution function for X if it is (according to Definition 4) internally stronger than the distribution function G X (x).
When comparing elicited or given distribution functions
Although the concept of internal strength can be regarded as the basis of a natural way of eliciting distribution functions, it does not really provide us with a useful means of comparing the nature of distribution functions that have been already elicited for different random variables. Therefore, once a distribution function has been elicited, an alternative concept of strength is required so that the function can be interpreted in this more outward-looking context. This alternative concept of strength will be referred to as external strength. It is a concept that not only can be applied to distribution functions that need to be derived using the kind of systematic elicitation process referred to in the previous section, but also to distribution functions that are directly identified as providing the best representations of our beliefs, which will be referred to as 'given' distribution functions, e.g. the distribution function of a variable that represents the outcome of a well-understood physical process. As was the case for internal strength, the concept of external strength will be defined separately for continuous and for discrete distribution functions. (2), and we define the set G[a] in the same way with respect to the variable Y instead of X and the distribution function G Y (y) instead of F X (x).
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that are independent of X and Y , the function F X (x) is defined as being externally stronger than the function G Y (y) at the resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if
This definition can be interpreted as meaning that if the function F X (x) is judged as being externally stronger than the function G Y (y) then, relative to the reference event R(λ), it better represents the uncertainty associated with the variable X than G Y (y)
represents the uncertainty associated with the variable Y .
In comparison to the definition of internal strength in equation (3), it is naturally appealing to have the maximization operator on the right-hand side of equation (5) instead of the minimization operator, as this of course implies that all the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ F[λ]} are greater than any similarity in the set {S(A, R(λ)) :
However, it would not have been sensible to have defined internal strength such that the maximization instead of the minimization operator appears on the righthand side of equation (3), as using such a strong condition as the basis for an elicitation process would generally impede the ease with which such a process could develop.
To give an example of the application of Definition 5, let us compare a uniform distri- Under these assumptions, it would be expected that the similarities in the set
} would all be regarded as being quite high. This is because the event R(λ) is the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment, i.e. a random spin of a wheel, while any event in the set F[λ] feels like it can be almost be treated as though it is the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment. On the other hand, the doctor's uncertainty about whether or not any given event in the set G[λ] will occur can be regarded as depending largely on his incomplete knowledge about highly complex biological processes in the human body. Therefore it would be expected that, according to Definition 5, the function F X (x) would be judged as being externally stronger than the function G Y (y) which can be interpreted as meaning that, relative to the spin-of-a-wheel event R(λ), the function F X (x) performs better than the function G Y (y) at representing the uncertainty that these functions are intended to represent.
Definition 6: External strength for elicited or given discrete distribution functions Let X and Y be two discrete random variables that can only take values in the finite or countable sets x = {x 1 , x 2 , . . .} and y = {y 1 , y 2 , . . .} respectively, and let F X (x) and G Y (y) be elicited or given distribution functions for these two variables respectively. Also, let the events
. . be scaling events that are independent of the variables X and Y . Furthermore, we define the set of events F[a] as in equation (4), and we define the set G[a] in the same way with respect to the variable Y and the distribution function
It now follows that, for a given discrete or continuous reference set of events R that are independent of the variables X and Y and the scaling events
is defined as being externally stronger than the function G Y (y) at the resolution λ, where λ ∈ Λ, if the condition in equation (5) is satisfied with respect to the definitions currently being used.
This definition can be applied to the motivating example referred to in the Introduction, i.e. Ellsberg's two urn example. In particular, we will denote the outcomes of drawing a ball out of the first urn and the second urn in this example as the random variables X and Y respectively, and we will denote the distribution functions for these two variables as F X (x) and G Y (y) respectively. The reference set R and the resolution λ will be defined as in the earlier examples. Now let us imagine that, with regard to both the first and the second urns, an individual elicits a probability mass function that assigns a probability of 0.5 to both the events of drawing out a red ball and drawing out a black ball. This would seem to be quite a rational decision to make. We also could consider applying Definition 6 to the governor election example outlined in Section 3.2 under the assumption that the political analyst has already used Definition 4 of internal strength to elicit a distribution function H Z (z) to the events z 1 , z 2 , ..., z 5 of each of the five candidates winning. With the reference set R and the resolution λ defined as in the previous examples, it should be fairly clear why this distribution function is likely to be considered externally weaker than the distribution function G Y (y) from Ellsberg's two urn example. However, it would be much less easy to predict whether any given political analyst would decide that the function H Z (z) is externally stronger, weaker or neither stronger nor weaker than the distribution function F X (x) from this earlier example.
3.4. Sensitivity to the choice of the reference set R and the resolution λ
In general, Definitions 3 to 6 of internal and external strength depend on the reference set of events R being used. More comments will be made with regard to this matter in Section 4. However for now, let us clarify that if, according to the definition given in Section 2.6, a discrete or continuous reference set R 0 is compatible with another discrete or continuous reference set R 1 , then Definitions 3 to 6 will not be affected by whether the reference set R 0 or R 1 is used, provided that the resolution λ ∈ Λ 0 ∩ Λ 1 , where Λ 0 and Λ 1 are as defined in Section 2.6.
With regard to the choice of the resolution level λ, it could be argued that the further that λ is away from the value 0.5, the greater the detail in which the characteristics of the distribution functions involved in the Definitions 3 to 6 may be explored. On the other hand, it is known that people have difficulty in weighing up the uncertainty associated with events that are very unlikely or very likely to occur, which is a disadvantage that could apply if λ was less than say 0.05 or greater than say 0.95. Nevertheless, it would be expected that in many applications, Definitions 3 to 6 will be largely insensitive to the choice of the value of λ over the range [0.05, 0.95], which is the range for λ that has been used in the examples that have been considered so far.
When comparing distribution functions derived by formal reasoning
Of course, not all distribution functions can be regarded as having been derived by some method of direct evaluation. Therefore, let us now turn our attention to defining the concept of strength in the case where we wish to compare the nature of distribution functions that have been derived using any type of method including through the use of a formal system of reasoning, e.g. derived by applying the standard rules of probability. In particular, this will be achieved by simply using a more general definition of the concept of external strength than the definitions of this concept presented in Section 3.3.
Definition 7: General definition of external strength
Let two random variables X and Y have distribution functions F X (x) and G Y (y) respectively. Also, let M F and M G be two sets of reasoning processes that could be used to measure the minimum similarity S F and the maximum similarity S G respectively, where these similarities are as defined in equation (5) 
where M ∈ M denotes 'over all reasoning processes in the set M'.
Clearly in the special case considered in Section 3.3, the sets M F and M G each contain only one reasoning process, which is the method of direct evaluation. More generally though we are faced with the problem that Definition 7 may depend on the choices that are made for the sets M F and M G . In many cases, this problem can be largely avoided by choosing the sets M F and M G to be large enough so that they contain all methods of reasoning that are relevant to measuring the similarities concerned. However, as will be illustrated in Section 3.6, this may be difficult to achieve if there are one or more potentially relevant methods of reasoning that are not well understood.
Observe that when distribution functions are derived by formal systems of reasoning rather than by a direct method of evaluation, the problem also arises that the distribution function for any given random variable may itself depend on which system of reasoning is used to derive it. Due to this possibility, the following definition is required.
Definition 8: Criterion for choosing between distribution functions
We will assume that F X (x) and G X (x) are two proposed distribution functions for the random variable X that have been derived using two separate methods of reasoning.
Under this assumption if, in Definition 7, the random variable Y is assumed to be equivalent to X, and the sets M F and M G are regarded by the given individual who has the task of evaluating the similarities in equation (6) as containing all methods of reasoning that are relevant for this task, then the function F X (x) will be favoured over G X (x) as being the distribution function for X if it is externally stronger than G X (x) according to Definition 7.
We can interpret this definition as meaning that F X (x) will be favoured over G X (x)
as being the distribution function of X if, relative to the reference event R(λ), it better represents the uncertainty associated with the variable X than the function G X (x).
Applying the concept of strength to the Bayesian-fiducial controversy
In this section, we will apply the concept of external strength to the controversy about whether fiducial reasoning is of any use in circumstances where the fiducial distribution function is equal to a posterior distribution function corresponding to a given choice of the prior distribution function. We will concern ourselves only with the case where inferences need to be made about the mean µ of a normal density function that has a known variance σ 2 on the basis of a random sample x of n values drawn from the density function, since it will be seen that the issues that are explored in analysing this case are relevant to many other cases. The type of fiducial inference that will be applied will be subjective fiducial inference as outlined in Bowater and Guzmán (2018) .
Let it be assumed that very little or nothing was known about µ before the sample x was observed. In a Bayesian analysis, it is common to try to represent this lack of prior knowledge by placing a diffuse symmetric density function over µ centred at some given prior median µ 0 . Assuming this has been done, let the corresponding prior and posterior distribution functions be denoted as D(µ) and D(µ | x) respectively. However, these distribution functions are not sufficient to define the prior and posterior distributions of µ under the definition of probability being considered. As has already been established, to complete these definitions we need to evaluate the strengths of these distribution functions relative to other distribution functions of interest. In the current context, it is clear that this needs to be done by applying Definition 7 of external strength.
To apply this definition, it will be assumed that there is only the method of direct evaluation in the set of reasoning processes M µ that will used to measure the similarities in equation (6) with respect to the prior distribution function D(µ), and that there is only Bayesian reasoning in the set of reasoning processes M µ|x that will used to measure these similarities with respect to the posterior distribution function D(µ | x). By Bayesian reasoning it is meant any system of reasoning that is related to the way that Bayes' theorem updates the prior to the posterior distribution function by combining it with the likelihood function. The reference set R and the resolution λ will be defined as in previous examples.
Under these assumptions, if the set of events D µ [λ] is defined as the set F[λ] was defined in equation (2) but with respect to the variable µ and the prior distribution function D(µ), then it would be expected that the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) :
} would all be regarded as being very low. In fact, we would expect that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any directly elicited distribution function (for any random variable in any context) that could be regarded as being externally weaker than the prior distribution function D(µ) according to Definition 7. This is because, apart from needing to satisfy the condition that it is diffuse and symmetric, the choice will also depend on the arbitrary decision that needs to be made about how diffuse the prior density function for µ should be.
was defined in equation (2) with a distribution function C(µ | x) that is the result of using Bayes' theorem to update a prior density function of the form c(µ) = constant ∀µ ∈ (−∞, ∞). We should first note that, under the definition of probability being used in the present work, it would seem inappropriate to refer to C(µ | x) as a posterior distribution function, since it is based on a prior density function c(µ) that does not follow the standard mathematical rules of probability, in particular it is an improper density function. Second, since the function C(µ | x) is only being used to approximate the function D(µ | x), its external 20 strength relative to other distribution functions must be inherited from D(µ | x), i.e. it must be roughly determined by the external strength of D(µ | x) relative to the functions in question.
We will now turn to the application of subjective fiducial inference to the case of interest. The terminology that will be used corresponds to Bowater and Guzmán (2018) , nevertheless the way that subjective fiducial inference will be applied to this case is equivalent to what was outlined in both Bowater (2017b) and Bowater and Guzmán (2018) .
Since the sample meanx is a sufficient statistic for µ, it can be assumed to be the fiducial statistic in this case. Defining the primary random variable (primary r.v.) Γ as having a standard normal density means that it can be assumed that the data x is generated by the following data generating algorithm:
1) Generate a value γ for the random variable Γ by randomly drawing this value from the standard normal density function.
2) Determinex by setting Γ equal to γ and X equal tox in the transformation
3) Generate the data set x by conditioning the joint density function of this data set given µ on the already generated value of the sample meanx.
It now follows that the fiducial distribution function of µ is determined, according to the general rule given in Bowater and Guzmán (2018) , by setting X equal tox and treating µ as a random variable in equation (7), which implies that this distribution function is defined by the expression
This distribution function of µ is the same as the function C(µ | x) that was defined earlier. However, to evaluate the external strength of this distribution function relative to other distribution functions, it will now be assumed that fiducial reasoning is the only type of reasoning in the set of reasoning processes M C that, under the definition in equation (6), will be used to measure the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) :
where C µ|x [λ] is defined as F[λ] was defined in equation (2) but with respect to the variable µ and the distribution function C(µ | x). By fiducial reasoning it is meant any system of reasoning that directly attempts to justify the fiducial argument, which will be interpreted to be the argument that the density function of the primary r.v. Γ should be the same both before and after the data x has been observed.
To perform the task just mentioned, let us proceed by reanalysing one of the abstract scenarios that were outlined in Bowater (2017b) . In the scenario in question, it is imagined that someone, who will be referred to as the selector, randomly draws a ball out of an urn containing 7 red balls and 3 blue balls and then, without looking at the ball, hands it to an assistant. The assistant, by contrast, looks at the ball, but conceals it from the selector, and then places it under a cup. The selector believes that the assistant smiled when he looked at the ball. Finally, the selector is asked to assign a probability to the event that the ball under the cup is red. We assume that it was known from the outset that the aim of this exercise was for the selector to assign a probability to this particular event.
In this scenario, let us now imagine that, relative to other distribution functions of interest, the selector wishes to evaluate the external strength of the Bernoulli distribution function B Y (y) that corresponds to assigning a probability of 0.7 to the event that the ball under the cup is red (y = 1), and a probability of 0.3 to the event that it is blue (y = 0). This means that he will need to evaluate the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : In doing this, it will be assumed that the selector takes into account the fact that a smile by the assistant would be information that could imply that it is less likely or more likely that the ball under the cup is red. Therefore, his evaluation of the similarities in question must depend on his subjective judgement regarding the meaning of the assistant's supposed smile. Nevertheless, he may feel that, if the assistant had indeed smiled, he would not really have understood the smile's meaning. In this case, it would seem rational for him to conclude that the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ B[λ]} could be at least approximately evaluated by making the assumption that he had put the ball directly under the cup rather than giving the assistant an opportunity to look at the ball. Under this assumption, since along with the event R(λ), the propensity of either of the two events in B[λ] to occur would only depend on the outcome of a well-understood physical experiment, it would be expected that he would regard both of the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ B[λ]} as being equal or very close to the highest possible similarity that can exist between two events, which is a conclusion that therefore could be justified as being valid or approximately valid in the scenario that is of genuine interest.
Returning to the evaluation of the relative external strength of the fiducial distribution function C(µ | x), let us assume that, in step 1 of the data generating algorithm outlined above, the value γ of the primary r.v. Γ is generated by a well-understood physical experiment, which is usually a reasonable assumption to make. We will now make an analogy between the uncertainty about the value of γ after the data has been observed in this case, and the uncertainty about the colour of the ball under the cup in the scenario that has just been outlined. In particular, given that little or nothing was known about µ before the data x was observed, the event of observing the data should be akin to the event of the selector believing that the assistant smiled when he looked at the ball in question, and hence this event should have little or no meaning in terms of its effect on the uncertainty that is felt about the value of γ. As a result if, after the data has been observed, Γ is assigned the same distribution function as before the data has been observed, i.e. a standard normal distribution function, then it would be expected that the relative external strength of this function would be regarded as being similar to the relative external strength of the function B Y (y). Since the distribution function C(µ | x)
is fully defined by this distribution function for Γ and known constants, it can therefore be argued that the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ C µ|x [λ]} as defined earlier should all be regarded as being equal or quite close to the highest possible similarity that can exist between two events.
This conclusion could hardly be more different to the conclusion that was reached when the relative external strength of the same distribution function C(µ | x) was evaluated by effectively taking into account its approximation to the distribution function D(µ | x), and then applying only Bayesian reasoning. On account of this, and in accordance with the definition of a probability distribution given in Section 2.2, it could be proposed that the posterior distribution for µ that corresponds to the use of a flat improper prior density for µ would be better described as the fiducial distribution for µ, since the relative external strength of the distribution function in question C(µ | x) would be naturally justified using fiducial rather than Bayesian reasoning, and arguably rather than any other currently known form of statistical reasoning, if all these reasoning processes were included in the set M C .
Example of using Definition 8 to choose between distribution functions
We will now apply Definition 8 to an example where there are two possible distribution functions for the same random variable. In particular, let it be imagined that in the case analysed in the previous section, there is now a notable but quite a low level of prior belief that µ will not be a very long distance from a given value µ 1 . We will assume that in applying the Bayesian method, this prior belief about µ is represented as a normal prior density function for µ with mean µ 1 and a moderate to large variance. Let the resulting posterior distribution function be denoted by I(µ | x). Alternatively, we could apply the fiducial method to this problem, under the assumption that it may be adequate to not take into account the prior belief about µ in forming a post-data distribution function for µ. Therefore, again the fiducial distribution function for µ will be C(µ | x) as defined in Section 3.6.
Let I µ|x [λ] be defined as F[λ] was defined in equation (2) but with respect to the variable µ and the distribution function I(µ | x). Now, in applying Definition 8 to choose which is the most appropriate distribution function for µ out of I(µ | x) and C(µ | x) after the data has been observed, let us assume that the set of reasoning processes that will be used to evaluate both the set of similarities {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ I µ|x [λ]} and the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ C µ|x [λ]} contains both Bayesian and standard fiducial reasoning but no other method of reasoning. It is clear though that the former set of similarities can only be evaluated indirectly using fiducial reasoning, while the latter set of similarities can only be evaluated indirectly using Bayesian reasoning.
If we apply Bayesian reasoning to evaluate the similarities {S(A, R(λ)) :
then since choosing a prior density function to represent the prior beliefs about µ in question is still fairly arbitrary, it would be expected that these similarities will be regarded in general as being only moderately higher than the similarities in the set 
Continuous measurement of external strength
The concept of external strength has been defined as an ordinal measurement, i.e. using the definitions that have been given we are able to rank distribution functions in terms of their external strength. However, a question that naturally arises is whether it is possible to measure on a continuous scale some kind of characteristic that incorporates the essence of the concept of external strength. In this section, we will only consider how this could be done in the special case where we wish to compare distribution functions that have already been classified as even-similarity distribution functions according to the following definition.
Definition 9: An even-similarity distribution function
If F X (x) is the distribution function of a random variable X then, for a given reference set of events R that satisfies the assumptions of Definition 3 or Definition 4 depending respectively on whether X is a continuous or a discrete variable, the function F X (x) will be defined as being an even-similarity distribution function at the resolution level λ, if the minimum similarity S F is equal to the maximum similarity S F according to the notation used in equation (5).
A continuous measure of external strength could now be defined in the following way.
Definition 10: Proposed continuous measure of external strength
With respect to a given reference set of events R and a given resolution λ, let F X (x), G Y (y) and H Z (z) be even-strength distribution functions for any three given random variables X, Y and Z respectively, where X and Z are independent from each other and, according to Definition 7, the function G Y (y) is not externally weaker than F X (x) and is not externally stronger than H Z (z). We define 
where L(α) is a scaling event that is independent of the variable X, the variable Z, the event R(λ) and the scaling events that may have been used to define the sets F[λ] and To give an example, we can apply Definition 10 to the case considered in Section 3.6.
In particular, it would appear acceptable to assume that the function F X (x) in this definition could be the prior or posterior distribution function D(µ) or D(µ | x), the function G Y (y) could be the fiducial distribution function C(µ | x), and the function H Z (z) could be the Bernoulli distribution function U Z (z) that corresponds to assigning a probability of λ to the event of drawing a ball out of an urn containing k distinctly labelled balls that belongs to a given subset of λk balls (z = 1), and a probability of 1−λ to the complement of this event (z = 0). If it is also assumed that the similarity on the left-hand side of equation (8) is evaluated by using fiducial reasoning, and the similarity on the right-hand side of this equation is evaluated directly if F X (x) is taken to be D(µ),
or by using Bayesian reasoning if F X (x) is taken to be D(µ | x), then by using the same type of principles that were explained in Section 3.6, it could be argued that α should be equal or close to one, which could be interpreted as meaning that the external strength of C(µ | x) is equal to that of U Z (z), or is at least much closer to that of U Z (z) than to that of D(µ) or D(µ | x).
Discussion
We will now discuss how well the theory outlined in the present paper addresses the criticisms 1 to 4 listed in the Introduction of the definition of probability outlined in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b .
Criticism 1: Satisfying the additivity rule of probability
Obeying the additivity rule is no longer a goal for the theory, as was the case in Bowater (2017a), but rather an assumption upon which the definition of probability is constructed. In particular, to guarantee that this assumption is satisfied, this definition has been based exclusively on probability distribution functions instead of also basing it on the probabilities of events in isolation. Nevertheless, in any given situation, the adequacy of making the assumption that probabilities are additive is reflected in the relative external strengths that are associated with the distribution functions concerned.
For example, if F X (x) is the distribution function of a given random variable X, but the assumption that the probabilities of X lying in different subsets of the sample space of X are additive was difficult to make, then we would not expect all the similarities in the set {S(A, R(λ)) : A ∈ F[λ]} to be regarded as being close to the highest similarity that can exist between two events, where the reference set R and the resolution λ are defined as in earlier examples.
Criticism 2: Precision of probability values
Unlike in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b where probabilities were only defined at potentially quite widely spaced points on the continuous interval [0, 1], probabilities can now take any value in this interval. Observe that this is the case even if the reference set of events R is discrete, as the precision by which probabilities can be measured is no longer determined by how the set R is defined as was the case in these earlier papers.
However, in contrast to this earlier work, there is no guarantee that the probability that is elicited to any given event is a unique value. This is because there may be a set F * of possible distribution functions F X (x) for a given variable X, each member of which is regarded to be internally stronger than any function F X (x) not in this set, but not internally stronger than any other function F X (x) within this set. It would be hoped though that usually the distribution functions in the set F * would be fairly similar to each other. In this type of situation, it is recommendable that any statistical analysis that requires a distribution function for X as an input incorporates a sensitivity analysis over the functions F X (x) in the set F * .
Criticism 3: Dependence of probabilities on the reference set
As was the case in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b , probabilities depend in general on the reference set of events R with respect to which they are defined. This is due to the fact that, in general, the relative internal and external strengths of a distribution function depend on the reference set R that is being used. As alluded to in Section 3.4, this issue though is made substantially less important by taking into account that reference sets may often be regarded as being compatible according to the definition given in Section 2.6.
We could of course attempt to remove this dependence completely by defining the reference set of events R under the added condition that the set of events O = {O 1 , O 2 , . . . , O k } in the case where R is discrete, or the continuous variable V in the case where R is continuous, must be the outcomes or outcome of a well-understood physical experiment. For a continuous reference set R, this would mean that the set R would be composed entirely of scaling events according to the definition in Section 2.5. However, placing this extra condition on the set R would not appear to be that helpful for at least two reasons.
First, since the definition of the set F[a] for a continuous distribution function given in equation (2) does not depend on the concept of a scaling event, the definitions of the set R given in Section 2.4 allow us at least to define the concepts of relative internal and external strength of a continuous distribution function without entering into a potentially woolly discussion about when an outcome or set of outcomes can or should be classified as being generated by a well-understood physical experiment. The second reason for using these earlier given definitions of the set R is that, in some situations, it may be useful to base assessments of uncertainty on a set R that contains events that are not associated at all with the outcome or outcomes of a well-understood physical experiment.
In particular, if the goal of an individual is to communicate his personal uncertainty about a random variable to others, then this may not be easy to do if he was evaluated the distribution function of the variable as being relatively externally weak. Therefore, the individual may wish to find an alternative reference set R that contains events associated with a standardized form of uncertainty that can be clearly appreciated by many people, but also with respect to which he would consider the distribution function of the variable concerned as being relatively externally strong.
As alluded to in Section 3.3, if the reference set of events R is based on the outcome of spinning the type of wheel described in Section 2.4, then for any resolution λ in the interval [0.05, 0.95] , it may be difficult to regard the distribution function H Z (z) associated with the governor election example, where z = {z 1 , z 2 , ..., z 5 } are the events of each of the five candidates winning, as being relatively externally strong. To give an example of the argument that has just been put forward, let us now change the reference set of events R to the reference set described in Section 2.6 that is based on the outcomes of drawing a ball out an urn that is known to only contain balls marked with a number in the range 1 to k, but for which the number of balls marked with any given number is entirely unknown. Under this assumption, it would seem plausible that, for any given resolution λ in [0.05, 0.95] permitted by the definition of the set R, a rational individual possibly could regard the distribution function H Z (z) just referred to as being relatively externally strong. Given that also the events in the reference set R are associated with a fairly standard and easily understood type of uncertainty, an individual may feel it is easier to convey his personal uncertainty about the outcome of the governor election to others by using this alternative reference set rather the original reference set.
Criticism 4: Lack of universality of the definition
The present work has addressed the lack of universality of the definition of probability outlined in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b by defining the concepts of internal and external strength so that they can be applied not just to continuous but also to discrete distribution functions, while at the same time eliminating the rather cumbersome notion advocated in these earlier papers that the concept of strength can also be applied to the probability of an individual event without any consideration of its association with a specified distribution function. Nevertheless, if desired, we can of course define this distribution function to be just the probability of the event and that of its complement,
i.e. a Bernoulli distribution function.
Some closing remarks
Returning to the overall motivation for the theory outlined in the present paper and for the earlier theory that was outlined in Bowater (2017a Bowater ( , 2017b , it is hoped, even more than was the case for this earlier theory, that the present theory gives the concept of probability a natural and useful real-world meaning. Moreover, it was shown in Section 3.3 how the present theory can account for a rational preference for the second urn in Ellsberg's two urn example, and how, by accounting for the same type of phenomenon,
